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Evaluation Studies, Inspectie van het Onderwijs, Park Voorn 4, 3500 GS Utrecht, Holland
ABSTRACT Many European countries have inspectorates of education and although they differ in
some ways, all focus on the quality of education, all undertake evaluations and all strive for
improvement in education. First, it will be argued that reciprocity between inspectors and inspectees
(such as schools, colleges and institutes for vocational education) is important both for the
evaluative work of inspectorates and for their work on behalf of quality improvement. Insights from
the social, behavioural and economic sciences are used to underpin this point. Nevertheless, in
practice it seems that only a minority of the 14 European inspectorates examined are involved in
a reciprocal relationship with their evaluands/inspectees. Second, reciprocity and quality assurance
organisations in higher education are discussed. It is argued that also in this ® eld reciprocity
between evaluator and evaluand is important. Third, several suggestions are made about how
educational inspectorates can become more involved in reciprocal relationships without `negotiating
the truth’. Suggestions for further research are offered.
Introduction
The assumptions underlying the activities of inspectorates of education usually include:
· whether or not quality control systems are effective and lead to a higher quality in
education;
· the time frame of the activities;
· the way in which the evaluation and assessment activities are organised, including the
level of independence of the position of the inspectorate from (central) government;
· the methodology of inspections;
· the contribution of the inspectorate’s activities to educational innovations;
· the occurrence of unintended side-effects of quality evaluation activities, such as t`each-
ing to the test’ and t`unnel vision’.
Attention is often not paid to the issue of reciprocity between organisations evaluating the
quality of education on the one side and schools and other education institutions on the
other.
Reciprocity has two dimensions. The ® rst dimension is the balance that is achieved
between what information and data inspectorates and similar organisations want from the
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educational ® eld and what the ® eld gets back in return from these activities. This is the
give-and-take-dimension of reciprocity.
Reciprocity also concerns the balance between the evaluability (or transparancy) that
inspectorates request from institutions versus the evaluability/transparancy of their own
organisation and work. This is you-too-me-too-dimension of reciprocity.
The question to be answered in this paper is: to what extent are educational inspec-
torates in Europe engaged in operations that are focused on realising reciprocity between
the evaluator (or: inspector) and evaluand (or: inspectee)?
Evaluators’ or inspectors’ organisations are the of® ces and persons active in the ® eld of
educational evaluations like Ofsted, the Inspection GeÂ neÂ rale de l’Education National and
the (Netherlands) Inspectie van het Onderwijs.
Evaluands are schools for primary and secondary education, colleges and institutions for
vocational education and teacher training departments in universities. They are the
recipients of the results from educational evaluations.
Structure of the Paper
First, the paper outlines why reciprocity is an important dimension when studying
educational inspectorates. Next, several assumptions are put forward dealing with the
relationship between reciprocity and evaluation. These assumptions can also be seen as
i`ssues’ that should be taken into account if one studies inspectorates. Then some empirical
evidence on the way in which reciprocity is dealt with by these of® ces in Europe is
presented. Although the focus is on inspectorates that evaluate the quality of education in
schools for primary, secondary and vocational/adult education, the issues raised are also
relevant for the ® eld of higher education. In particular, there is a reciprocity issue with
regard to quality evaluation and assurance in higher education. Finally, some conclusions
are drawn.
Why Is Reciprocity Important for Understanding the Relationship between Evaluators
and Evaluands in the Field of Education?
Insights from Stakeholder Evaluations
In textbooks on evaluation, room is given to the role stakeholders play in carrying out
evaluations. Rossi et al. (1999, p. 400) say that i`n undertaking their studies, evaluators
usually ® nd a diversity of individuals and groups with interest in their work and its
outcomes’. Reineke (1991) has produced a number of suggestions about how to involve
stakeholders in evaluations. The suggestions are based on the experiences working with
school district staff in the US. Amongst others he suggests identifying stakeholders, to
involve them early in evaluations and to do that continuously and actively. He also
suggests creating a structure for involvement. `Develop and use a conceptual framework
based in content familiar to stakeholders, that can help keep dialogue focused’. Greene
(1988) goes further in her participatory evaluation. She directly involves stakeholders in
planning, conducting and analysing the data in collaboration with the evaluator, whose
function might range from a team leader or consultant to that of a resource person to be
called only as needed (Rossi et al., 1999, pp. 57± 58). Although this approach is not without
critique (Pawson & Tilley, 1997), recent (comparative) studies of the role of inspectorates
say little about these developments, nor about the concept of reciprocity. In the SICI-study
by Standaert et al. (2000) the reciprocity concept is referred to only incidentally without any
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analysis of its importance. However, in (quasi-popular) magazines like the Times Higher
Education Supplement the lack of reciprocity that is to be attributed to, for example, Ofsted
or the Quality Assurance Agency in the UK, is not only rather high, but also of concern to
everybody interested in the impact and acceptability of the work of these organisations.
Insights from the Social and Economic Sciences
Social and behavioural scientists pay attention to reciprocity in the context of the social
exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1974; Klein Ikkink, 2000). Gouldner (1960) de® nes
reciprocity as the ratio of giving and receiving support within a certain period of time. A
relationship is reciprocal if the giving and receiving of support are balanced. For support,
one may read many different things: ® nancial, social, economic or i`nformation-oriented’
support (`knowledge support’).
Research focuses on the short versus long time perspective of reciprocity, indicating that
the more reciprocal a relationship is the longer it will survive. `The continuation of a
relationship is (also) evaluated on the basis of previous investments’ (Klein Ikkink, 2000,
p. 3). Reciprocity helps to build social capital between people and organisations. Social
capital concerns the importance of resources that, although possessed by other persons, are
available to a given individual (or organisation) through his or her social relations to these
other persons. The core of the theory and research of social capital is relatively simple.
`First, people better equipped with social resourcesÐ in the sense of their social network
and the resources of others they can call uponÐ will succeed better in attaining their goals.
Second, people will invest in relations with others in view of the perceived future value of
the social resources made available by these relations’ (Flap et al., 1999). Third, organisa-
tions with more social capital than others will probably be better off. The central idea here
is that more social capital is invested in reciprocal relationships.
As a review of more than 20 years of social science research in the ® eld of social
networks and social capital makes clear, person-to-person and organisational relationships
with a high degree of social capital are often more effective and ef® cient than other types
of relationships. This ® nding is important for anyone interested in the relationship between
evaluator and evaluand (Bulder et al., 1996; Flap et al. 1999; OECD, 2001). In line with this,
Coleman (1990a) made the important statement that a cohesive relationship or network is
a resource to its members because it promotes the willingness to co-operate with, and to
provide help to, others. Mayne et al. (in press) suggest that the more social capital is
available between organisations, the larger the likelihood is that partnership activities, for
example, between public schools and private organisations, will be effective. Given the
increased importance of collaboration between formal and informal organisations in the
® eld of education (central government, local or regional government, quangos, grass roots
organisations of parents and other stakeholders, `students as consumers’ and their organ-
isations), this highlights the importance of reciprocity as a dimension relevant for the work
of inspectors and evaluators.
Social science theory and research also helps to enlighten what happens to organisations
that evaluate, assess, inspect and monitor when there is no, or only very limited, attention
paid to reciprocity between evaluand and evaluator, or when the evaluation and monitor-
ing activities are done in a rather formal, systematised way that only marginally involves
relevant parties and stakeholders.
Transaction-costs economics, with its focus on the principal± agent relationship and the
rational choice decision making by agent and principal, is, as Goshal and Moran (1996,
p. 27) call it, `bad for practice’. They have applied the sociological idea of a self-ful® lling
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prophecy by predicting that systematised, formal controls, that in¯ uence trust within an
organisation, may end up producing the opposite of what they want to accomplish. Goshal
and Moran argue as follows:
· when organisations implement formal controls, they will become dependent on the
information about compliance with standards and performance, produced by these
systems;
· this shifts voluntary compliance and extra role-behaviour to compulsory compliance and
work-to-rule activities of the evaluands;
· it encourages more dif® cult-to-detect opportunitistic behaviour by the evaluands.
The costs of removing these controls will grow until it is no longer an option for the
organisation. Management’s options for responding to opportunistic behaviour will nar-
row to one or more controls that would serve only to increase opportunistic behaviour. As
this self-ful® lling prophecy plays itself out, management perceptions that employees are
opportunistic would become increasingly valid.
One unintended consequence of this self-ful® lling prophecy is the increase in
governance costs, making these organisations progressively uncompetitive. After all, the
task of designing and implementing such controls is among the main causes for the build
up of `unneeded bureaucrats and wasteful bureaucratic practices’ (Ghoshal & Moran,
1996). It can also enhance risk-averse behaviour, adversely affecting long-term perform-
ance.
In summary, if there is a focus on formalised monitoring and evaluation and a lack of
reciprocity, this could turn monitoring and evaluation into a t`rust killer’ (Leeuw, 2000).
Somewhat linked to this phenomenon is the idea that organisations that focus on
performance monitoring may get involved in the performance paradox. This refers to a
weak correlation between performance indicators and performance itself (Meyer &
O’Shaugnessy, 1993; Meyer & Gupta, 1994). For `performance’ one can read `quality’. The
`quality paradox’ then concerns the weak correlation between quality evaluation and
assessment activities on the one side and the quality itself on the other side.
This paradoxical phenomenon is caused by the tendency of performance indicators to
run down over time. They lose their value as measurements of performance and can no
longer discriminate between good and bad performers. As a result, the relationship
between actual and reported performance or quality deteriorates. Deterioration of perform-
ance indicators is caused by four processes (Meyer & Gupta, 1994, pp. 330± 342). The ® rst
process is called positive learning, that is, as performance or quality improves indicators
lose their sensitivity in detecting bad performance or low quality. Second, perverse
learning may occur, that is, when, although performance seems to improve, there is no
actual improvement and perhaps even a deterioration of performance or quality. The third
process, selection, refers to the replacement of poor performers with better performers,
which reduces differences in performance. Fourth, suppression occurs when differences in
performance are ignored.
Although the above focuses on unintended and even negative effects of auditing,
evaluation and monitoring for trust, two things have to be stressed. One is that, given the
amounts of (public) money spent on education, the need for transparency through
monitoring and evaluation is evident and crucial in contemporary society. Second, proba-
bly not all t`ypes’ of monitoring, auditing and evaluation are equally vulnerable to
phenomena such as the `performance paradox’. However, empirical research linking
t`ypes’ of monitoring and evaluation to this phenomenon under different institutional
conditions does not yet appear to be available for the education ® eld.
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Assumptions on Reciprocity and Evaluating Educational Quality
Why is reciprocity important when doing educational evaluations by inspectorates? Realist
evaluation methodology (Pawson & Tilley, 1997; Leeuw et al., 1998) indicates that it is
important to articulate the social and behavioural assumptions underlying reciprocity.
The ® rst assumption is that the level of trust between evaluator and evaluand increases
when inspectorates take reciprocity into account and act accordingly. Reciprocity implies
dialogue, debate, openness and (intellectual) investor± investee relationships instead of
primarily a top± down approach (Leeuw et al., 1998; Power, 1999, p. 134ff). Trust is
particularly important because, as Power (1999, p. 134) notes, t`he audit society ¼ re¯ ects
a tendency not to trust’.
The more such a relationship is characterised by trust, the larger the probability that the
evaluator takes into account the topics of educational quality, school effectiveness and
school ef® ciency that really matter for schools, students, parents and teachers instead of
taking only those into account that are political, administrative or procedural in nature.
Power (1999, p. 131), citing Braithwaite, says:
Government inspectors ensure the quality of your records, not the quality of your
deeds. If and when inspectors develop a reciprocal relationship with their in-
spectees, this role-behaviour probably will not occur any longer.
The more the relationship between inspector and inspectee is characterised by trust, the
larger the probability that the inspectees will act upon the ® ndings, evaluations and
recommendations of the educational evaluation of® cers. Here the mechanism is that trust
and mutual understanding act as an incentive for listening to the evaluator and not only
listening because one is obliged to do so.
A fourth assumption is that the more reciprocity is a leading item on the agenda of
inspectorates, the larger the probability is that they apply relevant and acceptable norms
and standards. This is at least partly caused by the fact that the information exchange
between evaluator and evaluand is more open and direct, when reciprocity is part of the
culture of a review of® ce.
The more reciprocity is a leading item on the agenda of educational evaluators, the
longer the period will be that evaluands are positive about the contributions of the
evaluators. Here the (behavioural) mechanism is that reciprocity creates a willingness to
continue the relationship between both parties over time.
The more an inspectorate itself is open to scrutiny and willing to live up to the standards
of transparancy required from their evaluands, the more the evaluands will trust the of® ce
and subsequently act upon the recommendations, ® ndings and evaluations of the evalua-
tors.
The more an inspectorate puts reciprocity high on the agenda, the larger the probability
is that the organisation will apply `proportional evaluations’, that is, will apply a practice
in which the evaluator primarily uses the self-assessments or self-evaluations by the
evaluand and only gets involved in on-site and primary data collection, when it is strictly
needed. The mechanism here is that evaluators are concerned about the `behavioural costs’
(HEFCE, 2000) or `administrative burden’ their work can create for the evaluand and also
strive to reduce these costs through proportionality in evaluation.
The more an inspectorate has reciprocity as a leading item on its agenda, the smaller the
probability of a performance paradox occurring. Here the mechanism is ® rst that due to the
reciprocal relationship the evaluator has a better, r`icher’ knowledge of what is going on
inside the institution (and hence is better equipped to detect under- or over-representation
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as a dimension of the performance paradox). Second, the trust mechanism works, because
reciprocity will reduce the chances of cheating. What also might happen is that evaluands
become more positive with regard to information-collecting approaches by inspectorates.
Reciprocity and the Evaluation of Educational Quality in Practice
Database and the Operationalisation of Concepts
Two sources have been used to ® nd out to what extent reciprocity, in practice, is on the
agenda of education inspectorates in Europe. The ® rst approach uses a report edited by
Maes et al. (1999); this report summarises characteristics of 14 inspectorates in Europe; it
looks into most or all levels of education. As this report was published in 1999, the data
collected are approximately 4 years old. As positions and activities of inspectorates, in
recent years, have changed quite often, the problem with this database is that, according
to some experts, several case-descriptions are no longer completely valid. Therefore, a
second more informal resource has been used in which material obtained from an expert
is central.2
The two dimensions of r`eciprocity’ have been operationalised as follows. The nature of
the database prevented the utilisation of more sophisticated operationalisations.
Operationalisation 1. This concerns the you-too-me-too-dimension of reciprocity. It focuses on
the evaluability that characterises inspectorates or evaluation of® ces. This dimension is
operationalised by information from the SICI-expert and by checking the content of Maes
et al. (1999) for answers to the following question: is the inspectorate/education review of® ce
evaluated externally and independently?
The rationale behind this item is that the more inspectorates are evaluated externally and
independently, the more they are open to critique and independent assessment and the
more they show a willingness to be discussed i`n public’. The larger this willingness, the
larger their contribution to (knowledge and experience) exchanges between inspectee and
inspector.
Operationalisation 2. This focuses on the give-and-take-dimension of reciprocity. It concerns
the extent to which the inspectorate is involving the public, schools, teachers, students and
others in the process of ® nding and developing inspection norms and criteria. It also
concerns the role the inspectorates play in informing the public and in participating in
public debates on education and in sharing their knowledge with others. This dimension
is operationalised for answers to the following two questions.
1. Are the evaluation norms and criteria of the inspectorate developed jointly with the
educational ® eld (that is inspectees) or are they developed by the quality evaluation
organisation on its own?
2. To what extent is the inspectorate participating in public debates about education?
The rationale is that the more organisations participate in debates, and the more they
involve inspectees in developing norms and criteria, the more reciprocal the relationship
will be.
For six out of the 14 inspectorates, external evaluations by independent agencies are part
of the game (Sweden, UK, Netherlands, Ireland, Northern Ireland and Scotland) (Table 1).
Sometimes these external agencies are national audit of® ces, sometimes they are universi-
ties. Eight organisations are not evaluated by independent external actors.
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With regard to the `you-too-me-too-dimension’ of reciprocity, this ® nding makes clear
that less than half the inspectorates can be characterised as organisations that are them-
selves scrutinised in a public and external way.
Three out of the 14 organisations (Sweden, Netherlands, UK) develop norms and criteria
for inspection and evaluation together with the educational ® eld (that is the inspectees).
Four inspectorates, to a lesser extent, involve schools, experts and other actors as partners
in this process (Scotland, Portugal, Ireland, Flanders). The remaining seven inspectorates
develop their norms, indicators and criteria without (bottom± up) participation from
stakeholders.
The data show that almost all of the inspectorates participate in public debates about
education.
The conclusion is that, in practice, reciprocity between evaluator and evaluand is not yet
fully developed within the 14 national or regional education review of® ces. Only a
minority of the European inspectorates of education is involved in a reciprocal relationship
with their evaluands. If one compares this level of attention with the importance attached
to the involvement of stakeholders, as is articulated in textbooks on evaluation, there is
room for improvement for inspectorates. How to improve will be discussed in the ® nal
section but ® rst attention will be paid to the issue of reciprocity when evaluating higher
education programmes.
Reciprocity and Quality Evaluation in Higher Education
Harvey (1999) recently described the general way in which (institutional) evaluations
within higher education take place in most of the (western) world:
Despite the very varied objects of evaluation and the array of different types of
agencies [in many different countries], there is a surprising conformance in the
methods that are adopted. Approaches to evaluation in higher education, as has
frequently been pointed out, are heavily dependent on three basic elements:
· self-assessment (or submission);
· peer evaluation;
· statistical or performance indicators.
The results are prepared as a report that usually becomes a public document, albeit that a
more detailed version may remain con® dential. Typically, the procedure is for the insti-
tution or programme of study (or subject area) to produce a self-evaluation report or some
other form of submission for assessment, such as a research pro® le. The qualitative
self-evaluation is often complemented by statistical data.
The report, and the appropriate statistical data, are scrutinised by an external body.
Sometimes more information is requested, either by the co-ordinating body or the team of
r`espected’ peers who will subsequently visit. This additional material may be received in
advance or be available during the visit.
The peer-review panel visits the institution. Usually such a visit lasts between 1 and 4
days. They attempt to relate the self-assessment document to what they see or, in practice,
hear. Often, they see relatively little as they spend most time closeted in a room having
discussions with group after group of `selected’ discussants. In some cases, the peers may
observe facilities or even the teaching and learning process itself, although the latter is rare
(Harvey, 1999).
Quite often there are systems of follow-up implemented to check for the sustainability
of the impact of the reports produced by quality assurance organisations.
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TABLE 1. Content-analysis of the SICI-report on Inspectorates of Education in Europe: A descriptive study (Maes
et al., l999) and information obtained from a SICI-expert
Are the norms and criteria
of the inspectorate/review To what extent is the
of® ce developed together inspectorate/review
Is the with the educational ® eld of® ce participating in
inspectorate/education (i.e. inspectees/evaluands) public debates about
review of® ce or are they developed by the education, sharing
evaluated inspector’s organisation on knowledge and
Country (externally)? its own? evidence?
Austria No The process of ® nding Yes
norms and criteria that the
inspectorate uses in its
evaluation & oversight work
are not developed together
with inspectees/evaluands
The Czech No The process of ® nding Yes, but only when the
Republic norms and criteria that the organisation is asked
n inspectorate uses in its to participate
n evaluation & oversight work
n are not developed together
n with the
n inspectees/evaluands
England Yes Yes. Discussions with Yes
groups and organisations
interested in education take
place but Ofsted itself
decides what is being
evaluated (and how)
and what not
Flanders No Somewhat Yes, but only the
minister who is
responsible, acts
France No No, norms are not Yes
developed jointly with the
inspectees/evaluands
The French- No No, norms are not Yes, but very
speaking developed together with discretely and focusing
community of inspectees/evaluands on defending the point
Belgium of view of the Minister
Hessen No No Yes
Ireland Somewhat Somewhat Yes, but not
independently of the
Dept of Education
The Yes Yes Yes
Netherlands
Northern Yes No, norms are not Yes, but in a low
Ireland developed together with pro® le (p. 346)
inspectees/evaluands
North-Rhine- No No, norms are not Occasionally
Westfaliia developed together with
inspectees/evaluands
Portugal No Somewhat No
Sweden Yes Yes Yes
Scotland Yes Somewhat Yes
For more detail, see Rohde and Leeuw (2001).
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Usually the functions of quality assessment can be distinguished between accountability-
oriented quality evaluation and improvement-oriented systems (Kalkwijk, 1998) or be-
tween control and support (Elmgren et al., 1999). The organisations that carry out these
tasks are largely funded by central governments but are at arms’ length from the
government. They are hardly ever part of inspectorates for education like the ones
described in this paper. Usually they are quangos or equivalents. Their focus is on
establishing the quality of higher education programmes, partly by reviewing the work of
internal evaluators and peer-reviewers or `visitation groups’. Sometimes quality assurance
organisations carry out institutional evaluations. In a growing number of (European)
countries, these organisations are also involved in accreditation.
Based on the analysis of the ways in which quality evaluations in higher education are
organised in six countries by Scheele (1998) and the Center for Quality Assurance and
Evaluations of Higher Education (CQAEHE) (1998) (Denmark, UK, Finland, France, Ger-
many and Sweden), the following conclusions can be drawn with regard to the attention
paid to reciprocity within these systems.
Three of these organisations (Centeret, QAA, Germany) are being evaluated externally
and independently on the you-too-me-too-dimension. On the give-and-take-dimension , most
of the organisations develop their norms and criteria together with the evaluands. How-
ever, the UK QAA is critised for the `heavy-handedness ’ of their approach (Turner, 2001).
All six organisations are playing a role in the contribution to public debates on higher
education.3
Reciprocity, therefore, is indeed on the agenda of these six organisations. However, Dill
(1997, p. 38) has argued that nowadays the quality evaluation (systems) in higher edu-
cation `have been in¯ uenced by traditional theories about regulation, including the logics
of hierarchical control through government inspection and performance auditing and
reliance on enhancing market competition through deregulation and information pro-
vision’. Next to `markets’ and `hierarchies’ the role of `social capital’ has to be prominent.
Social capital is t`he horizontal networks of social interaction that facilitate co-ordination,
communication, the sharing of community norms and which promote individual engage-
ment in a community’. Social capital, reciprocity and trust are closely related. Flap et al.
(1999) and Putnam (2000) have shown how important social capital is for the productivity
of organisations, including the quality of their services. However, Dill and Massy (1994)
argue that current quality evaluation policies in higher education in fact can contribute to
reducing social capital in academia, leading to what has been called `hollowed collegiality’.
Dill et al. (1996, p. 20) add to this the notion that i`n the current market condition of higher
education, there are few incentives for administrators or institutions to renew or increase
their collegial quality-assurance mechanisms’. This might be modi® ed as follows: given the
evidence about ways in which quality assurance models in education are being imitated
and standardised,4 there is doubt that collegial-driven models will be much less developed
and diffused than market/hierarchy-driven models.
Reciprocity, therefore, is also of relevance for higher education evaluators. Where trust
between teacher, researcher, student and management is crucial, quality evaluators that do
not invest enough in reciprocity run the risk of becoming t`rust killers’. This, in particular,
can be true if they focus too much on their `own’ norms and criteria without discussing
them in depth with their evaluands. As higher education has as one of its goals to help
produce social capital, the consequences of being a t`rust killer’ are serious. Some of the
debates in the UK on the QAA can be interpreted in these terms.
Second, evaluations can produce unintended side-effects, including `behavioural costs’
like game playing, orchestration and staff stress (HEFCE, 2000). Other examples are
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drop-out problems in academia due to a too heavy focus on the performance of schools
and students, teaching to the test and t`emplatism’ ( 5 focusing on t`emplates and bench-
marking [leading to] ª dumbing downº by de® ning subjects in terms of minimal achieve-
ments with the associated danger of teaching to the syllabus’. The more reciprocal the
relationship between evaluands and evaluators in higher education is, the more these
side-effects can be addressed properly.
How Important Should Reciprocity Be for Inspectorates of Education?
The ® rst reason is that direct and early feedback from students, schools, parents, pupils,
teachers and boards is important because nobody has an ultimate claim to truth. This point
has been made by Fitz Gibbon in her responses to, among others, Ofsted in the UK
(Fitz-Gibbon, 2000). Knowledge, in the end, is always conjectural, needs to be tested and
can never be taken for granted. That implies a plea for participation of inspectees in the
process of inspection and for independent evaluations of the work of inspectorates.
Second, every research or measurement `act’ with people runs the risk of realising
unintended side-effects or artefacts. This is also true for the work of inspectors and other
educational evaluators (Leeuw, 1996, 2000). De Wolf (2001) recently found, for the Nether-
lands, that there is a strong correlation between the attitude of a school’s management
about the inspectors’ work during their assessments and investigations on the one side and
the ® nal evaluation outcome by the inspectorate of the quality of schools on the other side.
Only 23% of the primary schools that were rated as having a low quality are positive about
the inspectors’ on-site investigation, while 46% of the schools that are rated as good are
positive about the `visit’ of the inspectors to the school. Apparently, on-site investigations
and attitudes of school management are correlated. Therefore, it is the more necessary to
realise a dialogue with evaluands like school boards, teachers and other inspectees. The
rationale is that this facilitates the sharing of information, perspectives, experiences and
t`heories’ between evaluators and evaluands; that probably will increases the relevance of
the work of inspectorates.
Linked to this is the third reason. If inspectorates are not deliberately involving students,
teachers, boards, parents and others in their processes of developing norms and criteria,
these stakeholders might bite back. Examples can already be found in the mass media and
elsewhere.5 Biting back reduces the credibility of the inspector’s organisation and work. As
losing one’s credibility is one of the most serious caveats for any evaluator (Leeuw et al.,
1994), this is a real danger.
It is somewhat of a paradox that where education is essentially a collaborative activity
for children and young adults for a large number of years, the attention paid by inspectors
to collaboration, partnering, and j`oined-up’ activities with inspectees is still rather limited.
Maybe the adage here should be to teach as one preaches. Patton (2000) goes even further:
he is of the opinion that every time an evaluator is doing his or her job, he should ask
himself what the evaluand gets out of this activity and what he or she learns from it.
Finally, when there is a reciprocal relationship, this reduces the likelihood of strategic
behaviour by inspectees, because when an evaluand acts in this way, he or she will
(immediately) lose credibility as a trustworthy partner to the inspectorate.
Three suggestions are offered as to how inspectorates of education could become more
involved in establishing reciprocal relationships.
First, it is important to realise that inspectorates are becoming more involved in
knowledge transfer from the of® ces to the schools, teachers, management and students.
Evaluation of® ces in education know a lot about schools, their works, their organisation,
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their quality and their pros and cons. The suggestion is to invest more in sharing that
knowledge with inspectees. An example can be found in the work of the Georgia Council
for School Performance (a kind of inspectorate) in the US. The knowledge transfer work of
this organisation was recently awarded a prize by the American Evaluation Association.
Fitz-Gibbon (2000) follows a somewhat similar route in the UK. By t`ransferring knowl-
edge’ from the inspectorate to society, reciprocity will increase.
Second, realise that inspectorates understand that reciprocity ® ts nicely with the network
concept of governance. More and more network management, steering through `social
capital’, is on the agenda of governments (Mayne et al., in press). Inspectorates should
invest in understanding these processes for their own assessments.
Third, although inspectorates consider that no reciprocity is bad for practice they should
also note that too much reciprocity will kill the independence of inspectorates and
probably will realise the `capture’ of the of® ces by stakeholders and may even lead to
`negotiating the truth’. Therefore, there is a need for a balancing act between independence
and reciprocity.
Some Suggestions for Further Research
Neo-institutionalism makes clear that although the (social and behavioural) mechanisms
inside organisations are crucial for understanding the way organisations and institutions
function, it is also true that organisational contingencies, and regional and national
differences are important. To understand what the relationships are between reciprocity,
trust, `behavioural costs’ of educational evaluations on the one side and the quality
of education on the other side, it is needed to take these contingencies into consi-
deration.
Theory-based evaluation that tries to go beyond good method and techniques as a basis
for understanding what works has been on the evaluation agenda for many years. Chen
(1990) published his advocacy of a theory-based approach 12 years ago and others started
writing on this subject already in the early 1970s. This movement has been re-energised by
the recent emergence of r`ealist’ and t`heory of change’ approaches. The theory-based
evaluation movement has been given added impetus by the challenging nature of contem-
porary (educational) policies. These are often expressed through complex programmes
which when evaluated do not always offer clear-cut results. This is also true for education.
If we are to generalise at all from evaluation ® ndings, data need to be interpreted
carefullyÐ within a theoretical framework.
As was mentioned in the Delors report (Delors et al., 1996), next to the well-known
functions of education (education how to know, how to do and how to be), the function
of education how to collaborate and how to create `social capital’ is important. Seen from
this perspective, the possibility that educational evaluations `help’ to reduce instead of
increase social capital within schools and institutes needs to be taken seriously. Since
Coleman (1990b), it is known that social capital of schools and parents/students is an
important co-determinant of the performance of schools and students (Morgan & Sorensen,
1999). Therefore, the relationships between reciprocity, social capital and educational
evaluations needs to be further researched.
Notes
[1] An earlier version of this paper was given as a keynote for the session `Reciprocity and interaction in
quality development’ , EU Congress `The Meaning of Quality in Education’ , Karlstadt, Sweden, 2± 4
April 2001. The author thanks the reviewers for their comments and suggestions.
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[2] To prevent misunderstanding: the 14 countries/regions are not to be considered representative for
what is going on in Europe in general, although amongst them Nordic, southern, eastern and
Anglo-Saxon countries/regions are involved. Thanks to Mr Johan van Bruggen, Netherlands Education
Inspectorate and senior of® cial of SICI, for the observation and for providing the additional material
[3] I thank Mr Ko Scheele for this information.
[4] See Hansen and Borum (1999) for a discussion of standardisation and imitation within evaluation in
general and evaluation of higher education in particular. Organisational imitation (or mimicry) is
linked to the theory of (organisational) isomorphism.
[5] See the Times Higher Education Supplement during the ® rst part of 2001. Almost every week there was
an article, l`etter to the editor’ or a column talking about the perception within academia of the role the
UK QAA played.
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